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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Eric Scott Spokas appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation, 
contending there was not substantial evidence supporting the district court’s finding that 
he violated probation.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 In 2015, Spokas pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on probation for 
four years.  (R., pp.29, 59.)  In May 2016, the state filed a motion for probation violation, 
alleging Spokas violated his probation in nine ways.  (R., pp.29-31.)  After Spokas admitted 
three of the probation violation allegations, the district court reinstated his probation in an 
order filed October 18, 2016.  (R., pp.59-63.)   
In November 2016, the state filed another motion for probation violation, alleging 
seven violations, including that Spokas violated his probation on October 21, 2016, by 
failing “to make immediate contact with his supervision officer to discuss his positive 
urinalysis results, as instructed by his supervising officer,” and by using marijuana “on or 
about the 21st day of October 2016, per urinalysis results.”  (R., pp.77-79.)  After a hearing, 
the district court found that Spokas violated those two conditions of probation and ordered 
his probation revoked, executed his original sentence of four years with two years fixed, 
and retained jurisdiction for up to one year.  (R., pp.92-93, 96-102.)  Spokas filed a timely 
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ISSUE 
 Spokas states the issue on appeal as: 
 Was there substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding 
that Mr. Spokas violated probation? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.) 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Spokas failed to show there was not substantial competent evidence from 
which the district court could conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he 
violated his probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence From Which The District Court Could 




Spokas contends the district court erred in finding he violated his probation “by 
failing to make immediate contact with his probation officer on October 21, 2016, to 
discuss his positive urinalysis test, and by using marijuana on or about October 21, 2016.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  Spokas’s arguments fail.  The evidence considered by the district 
court was more than adequate to satisfy a preponderance of the evidence standard and 
supports the district court’s finding that Spokas violated his probation.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[A] district court’s finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if 
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding.”  State v. Sanchez, 149 
Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009).  This Court will accept the district court’s findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous” but “may freely review the district court’s 
application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.”  Id. at 104, 233 P.3d at 
35 (citations omitted).     
 
C. There Was Substantial Evidence To Support The District Court’s Finding That 
Spokas Violated His Probation 
 
1. Factual Background 
On October 21, 2016, Spokas went to the Probation and Parole Department Office 
in the Emerald Building after his probation officer, Corinne Vitley, “directed him to do a 
urinalysis test . . . that day.”  (2/3/17 Tr., p.14, L.12 – p.15, L.11.)  Because Officer Vitley 
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was not at that office that day, Probation and Parole Officer Jeremy Wallingford conducted 
the urinalysis test on Spokas, and the result was presumptively positive for the presence of 
THC, indicative of marijuana use.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.14, L.24 – p.15, L.7; p.16, L.1 – p.20, 
L.23.)  Upon being informed of the test result, Spokas told Officer Wallingford that “it 
shouldn’t be positive, that he had not recently used marijuana[,]” but that he had used 
marijuana in the past, the last time occurring in May 2016.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.20, L.17 – p.23, 
L.1.)  Officer Wallingford instructed Spokas to contact Officer Vitley to discuss how she 
wanted to handle the positive urinalysis test.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.21, Ls.8-11.)   
Four days later, Spokas contacted Officer Vitley through email – but only about 
matters other than his positive urinalysis test result.  (1/25/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.13-22.)  In her 
attempt to discuss the test result with Spokas, Officer Vitley sent him an email instructing 
him to go into her office on November 3, 2016, “which he failed to do.”  (1/25/17 Tr., p.11, 
L.22 – p.12, L.3.)  According to Officer Vitley, “[s]o I didn’t have a chance to address the 
positive UA because I can only contact him through email.  So I was trying to get him into 
the office to address that positive UA.”  (1/25/17 Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.3.)   
 
2. Allegation 3: Failure To Report To Supervising Probation Officer To Discuss 
Positive Urinalysis Results Of October 21, 2016 
 
Allegation 3 of the state’s motion for probation violation asserted that Spokas failed 
“to report to his supervising officer on the dates and times specified, to wit: on the 21st day 
of October 2016, the defendant failed to make immediate contact with his supervising 
officer to discuss his positive urinalysis results, as instructed by his supervising officer.”  
(R., p.78.)  At the end of the evidentiary hearing on the state’s motion for probation 
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violation, the district court found that Spokas violated his probation by failing to 
immediately report to his probation officer, explaining: 
 As to Allegation 3, failing to report to his supervising officer on the 
dates and times specified:  To-wit, on the 21st day of October, 2016, the 
defendant made – failed to make immediate contact with his supervising 
officer to discuss his positive urinalysis results as instructed by his 
supervising officer, I find that that allegation has been proven in spite of the 
defendant’s testimony that he never took a urinalysis test, that he denied 
using marijuana, and that he denied being made aware that he had a positive 
urinalysis result.  I do find that the officer’s testimony that he submitted to 
an observed urinalysis on that date, that he told Mr. Spokas it was positive 
– and that it would make sense in the context of this – that he was contacted 
to make immediate contact with is immediate supervising officer.  He did 
not.  And I don’t find that his explanation there is credible at all.  So I find 
that Allegation 3 has been proven by a preponderance. 
 
(2/15/17 Tr., p.26, L.17 – p.27, L.12.)   
On appeal, Spokas argues that “[t]he district court’s finding was not supported by 
substantial evidence because there was no evidence [he] was ‘instructed by his supervising 
officer’ to make ‘immediate contact with his supervising officer’ after his positive 
presumptive urine test.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5 (emphasis added).)  Regardless of whether 
Spokas was instructed to contact Officer Vitley immediately or simply contact her – to 
discuss his positive urinalysis test result – the state presented substantial evidence that he 
violated his probation terms by failing to do so.1 
Although neither Officer Wallingford nor Officer Vitley testified that Spokas was 
instructed to make “immediate” contact with Vitley, they both testified that, following his 
positive urine test on October 21, 2016, he was instructed to contact Officer Vitley to 
discuss the positive test result.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.19, L.23 – p.21, L.11 (“And then, I instructed 
                                            
1  In Paragraph 2 of Spokas’s Agreement of Supervision with the Idaho Department of 
Correction, Spokas agreed to “report as directed by my probation/parole officer.”  (St. Ex. 
A.)  
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him to contact [Officer Vitley] to further discuss how she wanted to handle it, if she wanted 
him to re-test or what – or however she wanted to proceed with the case.”); 1/25/17 Tr., 
p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.11 (“He was instructed to contact me so we could talk about that 
result.”))  Officer Vitley’s testimony shows that, after Officer Wallingford instructed 
Spokas on October 21, 2016, to contact her, and after she instructed Spokas by email 
(presumably responding to his email the same day he sent it, October 25, 2016, see 1/25/17 
Tr., p.11, Ls.13-24) to come into her office to address the positive urine test, Spokas did 
not comply – either immediately or otherwise.  She testified:   
A He did go take a UA as instructed on I believe October 21st, and that 
result returned positive for marijuana or THC. 
 
Q And at the time that your office received a positive test from him for 
marijuana – testing positive for marijuana, was he instructed to do 
anything? 
 
A Yes.  He was instructed to contact me so we could talk about that 
result. 
 
Q And did he? 
 
A Not immediately.  I didn’t get a response from him until five days 
later, October 25th, so four days later, I believe. 
 
Q And when you spoke to him on the 25th, did you address this positive 
urinalysis? 
 
A No, because he just sent an email that said something about 
counseling, I believe, something about his anger management 
classes, that he wanted to get into anger management. 
 
 He did not address the positive UA.  And I emailed him back 
instructing him to come into my office on November 3rd, which he 
failed to do. 
 
 So I didn’t have a chance to address the positive UA because I can 
only contact him through email.  So I was trying to get him into the 
office to address that positive UA. 
 
--
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Q And just to clarify what you said earlier.  He indicated to you that is 
the only way to communicate with him is by email? 
 




 And that he would check his email every two hours?  Is that what 




(1/25/17 Tr., p.11, L.4 – p.12, L.11.) 
Officer Vitley also testified that, after Spokas sent her the email on October 25, 
2016, about anger management counseling, he emailed her three days later informing her 
that (1) he had completed orientation for vocational rehabilitation, (2) he had another 
appointment with vocational rehabilitation on November 1st, (3) “he was having trouble 
paying for the anger management classes,” (4) “he wanted to complete the classes as soon 
as possible since the Court had ordered those classes[,]” and (5) he was “still at the Mission 
and that he was usually checked in for the evening there by 6:00 p.m. with no exception[.]”  
(1/25/17 Tr., p.19, L.24 - p.21, L.3.)  Although Officer Vitley emailed Spokas on 
November 2, 2016, telling him to go to the Emerald office to retrieve some paperwork, 
Spokas did not report to the Emerald office as directed, and was arrested on the probation 
violation affidavit at his workplace on November 4, 2016, by another officer.  (1/25/17 Tr., 
p.21, Ls. 8-25.)   
In sum, the evidence showed that right after Spokas had a positive urinalysis test 
result on October 21, 2016, Officer Wallingford instructed him to report to his supervising 
probation officer, Officer Vitley, to discuss that test result.  Officer Vitley also attempted 
to have Spokas come into her office on November 3, 2016, to discuss the positive test 
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result.  Officer Vitley’s testimony shows that Spokas did not contact her between October 
21st and November 4th (when he was arrested on the probation violation warrant) to discuss 
his positive urinalysis test result, although he contacted her by email for other purposes.  In 
fact, Officer Vitley’s testimony reflects that Spokas never discussed his positive urinalysis 
test result with her.   
Regardless of whether Spokas was instructed by Officer Wallingford on October 
21st to “immediately” contact Officer Vitley to discuss his positive urinalysis test result, he 
was instructed to contact her for that purpose, and completely failed to do so.  Therefore, 
the district court’s determination that Spokas violated his probation by failing to contact 
his supervising officer when instructed to do so – regardless of whether he was instructed 
to do so immediately – is supported by substantial evidence.  See Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 
105, 233 P.3d at 36.  Based on the testimony of Officers Wallingford and Vitley, Spokas 
has failed to demonstrate any error in this determination, and he is not entitled to relief. 
 
3. Allegation 5: Using Marijuana On Or About October 21, 2016, Per Urinalysis 
Results 
 
Allegation 5 of the state’s motion for probation violation alleged that Spokas used 
“a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana on or about the 21st day of October 2016, per 
urinalysis results.”  (R., p.78.)  As explained above, on October 21, 2016, Officer 
Wallingford conducted a urinalysis test on Spokas at the request of Spokas’s supervising 
probation officer, Officer Vitley.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.14, L.12 – p.15, L.11.)  The urinalysis test 
result was presumptively positive for the presence of THC, associated with marijuana use.  
(2/3/17 Tr., p.16, L.1 – p.20, L.11.)  Officer Wallingford testified that after he advised 
Spokas of the positive urinalysis test result, he informed him that he had the right to 
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challenge the test, and that he has seen presumptive positive test results return negative 
after being re-tested by a lab, and vice-versa.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.10-22; p.28, Ls.9-17.)  
Upon questioning by the district court, Officer Wallingford explained that he has conducted 
“[p]robably thousands” of the same type of test, and has found the test generally reliable 
for the purposes of probation.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.29, L.14 – p.30, L. 2.)  
Spokas testified at the probation violation motion hearing that he did not even recall 
going to the probation and parole office, much less having a urinalysis test, on October 21 
(of 2016), as follows: 
Q When you did take a urinalysis on the 21st, you were made aware 
that it was positive for marijuana; is that correct? 
 
A I do not recall taking a urinalysis on the 21st.  I don’t recall going at 
any time to probation and parole during the 14th of October and the 
4th of November. 
 
Q So it is your testimony today that you never took a urinalysis? 
 
A To the best of my knowledge, I don’t remember anything like that, 
no. 
 
(1/25/17 Tr., p.48, Ls.15-24.)   
 Because Spokas denied that he even went to the probation and parole office on 
October 21, 2016, he necessarily also denied that, after being advised of the positive test 
result, he told Officer Wallingford he had not recently used marijuana and he last used it 
in May 2016. (See 2/3/17 Tr., p.20, L.22 – p.21, L.1.)  On appeal, Spokas abandons his 
hearing testimony and argues that “the presumptive urine test taken by Mr. Spokas, even 
if accurate, could only show that he used marijuana at some point in the past – possibly up 
to 77 days in the past.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  However, Spokas’s “77-day” argument 
was not presented to the district court at the evidentiary hearing; thus, there is no factual 
--
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basis in the record to discuss it on appeal.  See State v. Dahl, 162 Idaho 541, 400 P.3d 629, 
637-638 (Ct. App. 2017) (“Appellate courts are forums of review, not for a factual 
determination in the first instance.”).   
Spokas also contends that the October 21st urinalysis “could only demonstrate that 
[he] used marijuana at some point in the past, possibly before he was on supervised 
probation” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9), which began on October 18, 2016 (R., pp.59-63).2  
Spokas apparently is arguing that the October 18th Order Reinstating Probation gave him a 
clean slate and precluded any probation violation allegation from being based on marijuana 
use predating that Order.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.)  However, Spokas has failed to 
present any authority to support such a contention.  See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 
168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 
970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is 
lacking” and declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to “provide[] a single 
authority or legal proposition to support his argument”). 
Regardless of Spokas’s arguments, the state met its burden to establish that he 
violated his probation by a preponderance of the evidence.  See State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 
388, 391, 744 P.2d 116, 119 (Ct. App. 1987).  “A preponderance of the evidence means 
that the evidence shows something to be more probably true than not.”  In re Beyer v. State 
of Idaho, Transportation Dept., 155 Idaho 40, 45, 304 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ct. App. 2013) 
                                            
2  Spokas’s previous probation violation alleged that he had used “marijuana on or about 
the 3rd day of March 2016, per urinalysis results.”  (R., p.30.)  Therefore, even adopting 
Spokas’s 77-day theory, his positive urinalysis test result on October 21, 2016, could not 
have been based on that earlier conduct.  
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(citing Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481, 80 P.3d 1077, 1082 
(2003)).  At the end of the probation violation motion hearing, the district court ruled: 
Allegation 5, using a controlled substance, marijuana, on or about 
October 21, 2016, and there is a urinalysis result, I find that that allegation 
has been proven.  And I find that the presumptive test is reliable for purposes 
of establishing that it was in his system based on the testimony that was 
presented and in spite of Mr. Spokas’s testimony that he never was tested 
and he never tested positive because he never used in that timeframe. 
 
(2/15/17 Tr., p.27, L.17 – p.28, L.1.) 
As discussed, Officer Wallingford testified that he had conducted “[p]robably 
thousands” of the same type of urinalysis test given to Spokas, and has found the test 
generally reliable for the purposes of probation.  (2/3/17 Tr., p.29, L.14 – p.30, L. 2.)  That 
testimony alone constitutes substantial evidence by which the court could properly find it 
“to be more probably true than not,” In re Beyer, 155 Idaho at 45, 304 P.3d at 1211, that 
Spokas used “marijuana on or about the 21st day of October 2016, per the urinalysis results” 
(R., p.78).  Spokas has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s ruling in regard 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
revoking Spokas’s probation.   
 DATED this 2nd day of October, 2017. 
  
             
      _/s/ John C. McKinney__________ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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